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Retributive Reactions to Suspected Offenders:
The Importance of Social Categorizations
and Guilt Probability
Jan-Willem van Prooijen
Free University Amsterdam
In the current research, the author investigates the influence of
social categorizations on retributive emotions (e.g., anger) and
punishment intentions when people evaluate suspected offend-
ers as independent observers. It is argued that information that
guilt is certain or uncertain (i.e., guilt probability) has different
consequences for retributive reactions to ingroup and outgroup
suspects. In correspondence with predictions, results of four
experiments showed that people reacted more negatively to
ingroup than outgroup suspects when guilt was certain but that
people reacted more negatively to outgroup than ingroup suspects
when guilt was uncertain. It is concluded that guilt probability
moderates the influence of social categorizations on people’s
retributive reactions to suspected offenders.
Keywords: retribution; social categorizations; injustice; guilt
probability
In our world, we constantly witness acts of injustice. The
media are filled with news on crime and terror, leading
laypeople to respond to suspected offenders with strong
retributive emotions (e.g., anger, hostility) and punish-
ment intentions (Hogan & Emler, 1981; Miller &
Vidmar, 1981). Numerous social factors may influence
these retributive reactions to suspected offenders. Most
of these social factors are directly connected to the of-
fense, such as severity of the harm done, the extent to
which the suspect expresses remorse, and mitigating cir-
cumstances (e.g., Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002;
Darley, 2002). However, it also has been suggested that,
sometimes, social factors that are less directly related to
the specifics of the offense contribute to an observer’s
moral reactions. One of these latter factors is whether
the suspect and the observer share a common group
membership. Vidmar (2002) has described numerous
anecdotal incidents in which people reacted more puni-
tively to ingroup rather than to outgroup offenders. One
example that he describes in his chapter is how people
reacted to members of a Catholic religious order in the
Mt. Cashel Orphanage in Newfoundland, Canada.
These Catholic members had sexually abused young
boys that were under their care. In Newfoundland so-
ciety, where Catholics and Protestants both are salient
religious groups, Catholics expressed a much stronger
desire for severe punishment than did Protestants (for
details, see Vidmar, 2002).
These assumed effects of social categorizations on
people’s retributive reactions to suspected offenders are
connected to theoretical insights on people’s responses
to negative ingroup versus outgroup deviants; that is,
previous research has discovered that people often per-
ceive unlikable ingroup members more negatively than
unlikable outgroup members, a finding that has been re-
ferred to as the black sheep effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, &
Leyens, 1988; for a review, see Marques & Paez, 1994).
The black sheep effect has its roots in social identity the-
ory’s proposition that people seek to maintain a positive
social identity because they derive an important part of
their self-worth from their group memberships (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). One of the strategies that people adopt
to maintain a positive social identity is described by the
model of subjective group dynamics (Abrams, Marques,
Bown, & Henson, 2000; Marques, Abrams, Paez, &
Martinez-Taboada, 1998; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio,
2001): Ingroup members try to maximize differentiation
between their ingroup and relevant outgroups while
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simultaneously trying to normatively differentiate be-
tween ingroup members. This process of subjective
group dynamics is reflected in research findings that
people generally perceive ingroup members as more
favorable than outgroup members (“ingroup bias”)
(Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), but at the
same time, people derogate ingroup members that do
not comply to either specific ingroup norms or generic
norms that are embraced by the ingroup. Both ingroup
bias and the derogation of unfavorable group members
enable ingroup members to sustain a positive association
with the group.
Most research on the black sheep effect has focused
on ratings of negative deviants in terms of perceived
favorability: Participants typically evaluate to what extent
they believe that a target deviant has positive or negative
traits (for a review, see Marques & Paez, 1994; see also
Abrams et al., 2000; Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt,
2002; Eidelman & Biernat, 2003; Marques et al., 1998,
2001). Besides these perceptions, however, it has been
noted that the black sheep effect also is likely to general-
ize to people’s moral judgments, that is, their moral
emotions and punishment intentions (cf. Kerr, Hymes,
Anderson, & Weathers, 1995; Vidmar, 2002). After all,
suspected offenders can be regarded as deviants from
widely shared societal norms, and laypeople typically re-
spond with strong moral emotions and punishment in-
tentions to these suspected offenders (Carlsmith et al.,
2002; Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Folger, 2001;
Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999; Miller & Vidmar,
1981). The current research is focused on these retribu-
tive reactions to suspected offenders as a function of
social categorizations.
One of the reasons why the present research is fo-
cused on retributive reactions is because previous re-
search within the moral domain has produced findings
that, at first glance, seem inconsistent with the black
sheep effect. For example, in research on the role of race
in courtroom settings, findings often show prejudiced
responses of White juries to Black suspects and of Black
juries to White suspects (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; cf.
Kerr et al., 1995; Sargent & Bradfield, 2004). An illustra-
tion of such prejudiced responses can be found in a study
by Graham, Weiner, and Zucker (1997). These authors
investigated the American public’s reactions to O. J.
Simpson in the week following his arrest on the accusa-
tion of murdering his ex-wife and her male friend. These
authors found that African Americans reported less re-
tributive emotions and punishment intentions toward
O. J. Simpson than did White Americans. Apparently, the
extent to which O. J. Simpson’s ethnic group (African
American) corresponded to observers’ ethnic group influ-
enced observers’ retributive reactions to the suspected
offender, but in different ways than would be expected
based on the theoretical analysis presented here: People
responded more negatively to a suspected outgroup of-
fender rather than to a suspected ingroup offender.
It might be reasoned by some that the O. J. Simpson
case was controversial and that this may have influenced
the Graham et al. (1997) results. For instance, this spe-
cific case had numerous unique characteristics, such as
extensive media attention, the fact that the victim was
White, and the fact that the suspect was a famous sports
hero. However, these unique characteristics are at best
only part of the whole picture. Comparable ingroup
favorability results have been found in experimental set-
tings where artificially created mock juries attributed
more guilt to outgroup suspects (i.e., other race than
jury) rather than to ingroup suspects (i.e., same race as
jury) (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). Furthermore, re-
search has suggested that these findings are not limited
to categorizations based on race. For example, research
by Kerr et al. (1995, Exp. 1) has indicated that partici-
pants attributed less guilt to a suspect that did versus did
not share their religious beliefs. Taken together, these
previous research findings suggest that people some-
times display ingroup favoritism toward crime suspects.
How can these findings be reconciled with the model of
subjective group dynamics, which would predict that
people are more punitive to ingroup rather than to out-
group offenders?
In the current research, I focus on a factor that I hy-
pothesize to moderate the influence of social categoriza-
tions on people’s retributive reactions. This factor is sug-
gested by a striking consistent characteristic in research
settings that have revealed ingroup favoring responses to
suspected offenders: In those previous research settings,
participants typically responded to suspects whose guilt
was not yet established with certainty (e.g., Graham et al.,
1997; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). This was notably the
case in the study by Graham and her colleagues: Al-
though there were many pieces of evidence against O. J.
Simpson, and many people were convinced of his guilt,
his guilt versus innocence was strongly debated by oth-
ers.1 Moreover, in the Sommers and Ellsworth (2000)
studies, participants also were presented with scenarios
of uncertain guilt probability; in fact, perceived guilt was
one of the main dependent variables in these studies (cf.
Kerr et al., 1995). Thus, one typical characteristic of situ-
ations where people display ingroup favorability to sus-
pected offenders is that the guilt of the suspect is disput-
able. In the current research, I will refer to the extent to
which a suspect’s guilt has been proven beyond reason-
able doubt as guilt probability.
The idea that variations in guilt probability can deter-
mine the influence of social categorizations on people’s
retributive reactions fits well within the presented theo-
retical analysis of subjective group dynamics (Abrams
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et al., 2000; Marques et al., 1998; Marques et al., 2001).
Following this model’s proposition that people seek to
preserve a positive social identity by normatively differ-
entiating within the group, people are likely to respond
particularly negatively to ingroup rather than outgroup
offenders as a strategy to maintain a positive association
with their group. More specifically, group members are
able to symbolically exclude the ingroup offender by dis-
playing strong retributive reactions, thus diminishing
the possibility that the rest of the group is regarded as
guilty by association (cf. Vidmar, 2002). However, it
should be recognized that this strategy is suitable to pro-
tect one’s positive social identity only when confronted
with clear-cut evidence that the ingroup suspect is in fact
guilty of the offense. When a suspected offender’s guilt is
disputable, I propose that people have a better strategy
available to preserve positive group distinctiveness. Even
when people consider guilt to be equally uncertain for
an ingroup and outgroup suspect, they nevertheless are
likely to be more concerned about this uncertainty sur-
rounding the suspect’s guilt when the suspect is an in-
group member. After all, guilt uncertainty helps people
to disassociate their group from the offense, leading
them to be relatively more reluctant to display strong re-
tributive reactions to ingroup than outgroup suspects.
Indeed, group members may even experience it as im-
perative to take a relatively more favorable position to-
ward the ingroup than the outgroup suspect because of
generic norms that people should be loyal to fellow
group members that are in trouble (cf. Branscombe,
Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993).
Related to these propositions is an experiment by
Kerr et al. (1995, Exp. 2), who manipulated race of a
defendant (Black vs. White) and strength of evidence.
Their results indicated that jurors attributed more guilt
to ingroup suspects when the evidence was strong and
more guilt to outgroup suspects when the evidence was
weak. The present research extends the Kerr et al. exper-
iment in at least two important ways. First, whereas guilt
probability was the dependent variable in the Kerr et al.
study, in the current research, guilt probability is
operationalized as the independent variable: Orthogo-
nal manipulations ensured that participants perceived
guilt as equally certain or uncertain among ingroup and
outgroup suspects. Nevertheless, it is expected that this
guilt probability information has a more extreme impact
on retributive reactions to ingroup than outgroup sus-
pects because social identity concerns lead people to be
more concerned about guilt probability of ingroup sus-
pects when determining their retributive reactions. Sec-
ond, Kerr et al.’s experiment was constrained by a
boundary condition: They only found their effect
among minority group jurors (i.e., White jurors antici-
pating a mainly Black jury or Black jurors anticipating a
mainly White jury). In all likelihood, this boundary con-
dition was produced by the complex intergroup
situation in their study (i.e., a multiracial mock jury eval-
uating a Black vs. White suspect). Such a complex inter-
group jury situation is not an essential part of the under-
lying theoretical rationale, and hence—following
Ockham’s razor, which dictates that scientists should be
as parsimonious as possible—I propose that the pre-
dicted effects should materialize among observers who
do not anticipate these complex, intergroup interac-
tions. As such, the current research mirrors common
everyday life situations where laypeople form opinions
of crime suspects as independent observers (e.g., such as
when reading a newspaper).
The idea that people may display ingroup favoritism
in their retributive reactions toward suspected offenders
when guilt is uncertain has common ground with find-
ings obtained in related research areas. For example, re-
search on collective guilt has revealed that high identifi-
ers display a defensive reaction to their group’s history
when a description of this history contains both favor-
able and unfavorable information: High identifiers ex-
perience less guilt about their group’s past behaviors
than low identifiers if guilt information is ambiguous
(Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). The
research by Doosje and his colleagues is related to the
current propositions because by derivation their re-
search suggests that people protect their social identity
by defending the honor of fellow group members if the
guilt of those fellow group members is ambiguous. Fur-
thermore, research by Boeckmann and Tyler (1997) has
revealed that people are less concerned about the provi-
sions of procedural protections if crime suspects are
outgroup rather than ingroup members. The finding
that people attach more importance to correct legal pro-
cedures when determining guilt of ingroup rather than
outgroup suspects corresponds to the proposition of the
current research that people are more concerned about
guilt probability in the case of ingroup suspects when
determining what retributive reactions to show.
To summarize, in the current research, I investigate
the possibility that observers display stronger retributive
reactions to ingroup than outgroup offenders when the
suspected offender’s guilt turns out to be undisputable.
When guilt is uncertain, however, people are not only
likely to show less retributive reactions in general (i.e., it
stands to reason that people generally are less angry and
punitive when guilt is uncertain than when guilt is cer-
tain) but also people are expected to show relatively less
retributive reactions to ingroup than outgroup suspects.
To test this line of reasoning, I present four experiments
in which participants were confronted with varying types
of offenses. In all experiments, participants learned that
the suspected offender either was an ingroup or an
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outgroup member. Furthermore, participants received
guilt probability information. In Experiments 1 to 3, par-
ticipants either read that clear-cut pieces of evidence had
established the suspect’s guilt with 100% certainty (the
guilt certain conditions) or that mixed pieces of evi-
dence had established the suspect’s guilt with approxi-
mately 50% certainty (the guilt uncertain conditions).
In Experiment 4, guilt probability was manipulated by
providing participants with evidence that either proved
the suspect’s guilt with certainty or that suggested that
guilt was uncertain. In all experiments, I predicted that
participants would display more negative retributive re-
actions to ingroup than outgroup offenders when guilt
was certain but that participants would display ingroup
favoritism in their retributive reactions when guilt was
uncertain. The dependent variables were participants’
retributive emotions (Experiments 1 and 2) and their
punishment intentions (Experiments 3 and 4).
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants and design. The hypothesis was tested in a 2
(suspect categorization: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (guilt
probability: certain vs. uncertain) factorial design. A to-
tal of 122 participants (43 men, 79 women), varying in
age from 17 to 48 years (M = 21.00, SD = 3.83), were re-
cruited in the restaurant of the Free University Amster-
dam and participated voluntarily. The experiment was
preceded by another unrelated study. The studies lasted
a total of 45 min and participants were paid 5 euros for
participation.
Procedure. Upon entry in the laboratory, participants
were led to separate cubicles. In the cubicles, partici-
pants found computer equipment, which was used to
present the stimulus information and to register the re-
sults. Participants were asked to read and evaluate a sce-
nario. To enhance mundane realism, participants were
told that the scenario was based on true events at the soc-
cer world championships many years ago. The scenario
read as follows (manipulated information is in italics):
The Dutch national soccer team has to play against the
German national soccer team at the soccer world cham-
pionships. The evening before the match, the final en-
trance tickets are being sold illegally on the black mar-
ket. Profiteers are asking extremely high prices for the
illegal entrance tickets. That same night, an individual is
accused of illegally selling entrance tickets for exorbitant
prices. This individual, who is arrested by the police,
turns out to be a Dutch/German soccer fan. The police
start an investigation against the Dutch/German suspect.
After this information, I manipulated guilt probability.
In the certain condition, participants read the following:
The investigation proves that the suspect is indeed
guilty: Based on the clear-cut pieces of evidence, it can be
confidently concluded that it is 100% certain that this
suspect is in fact guilty of illegally selling entrance tickets.
In the guilt uncertain condition, however, participants
received the following information:
The investigation does not prove that the suspect is guilty.
Based on the mixed pieces of evidence, it can be roughly
estimated that there is approximately a 50% chance that
this suspect is in fact guilty of illegally selling entrance
tickets.
After the guilt probability manipulation, participants re-
sponded to the questions that pertained to the depen-
dent variables and manipulation checks. To measure
participants’ retributive affect toward the suspect, par-
ticipants responded to the following items (1 = not at all,
7 = very much): “How angry do you feel toward the sus-
pect?” and “How hostile do you feel toward the suspect?”
These two items were strongly correlated (r = .85, p <
.001) and I averaged them into a reliable retributive af-
fect scale (α = .92). To check the guilt probability manip-
ulation, participants responded to the following two
questions: “How certain is it that the suspect is guilty of
illegally selling entrance tickets?” (1 = very uncertain, 7 =
very certain) and “To what extent has the suspect’s guilt of
illegally selling entrance tickets been proven?” (1 = not at
all, 7 = very much). These two items were strongly corre-
lated (r = .83, p < .001) and I averaged them into a reli-
able guilt probability scale (α = .90). Finally, to check the
suspect categorization manipulation, participants were
asked to indicate dichotomously whether the suspect was
from the Netherlands or from Germany. After this,
participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results
Manipulation checks. On the dichotomous check of
suspect’s categorization, only 1 male participant gave an
incorrect answer. This 1 participant was included in the
analyses reported below (results were similar when this
participant was excluded). These results showed that
participants correctly identified whether the suspect was
an ingroup or an outgroup member.
On the guilt probability scale, a 2 × 2 ANOVA showed
a significant guilt probability main effect only, F(1, 118) =
204.52, p < .001. Participants in the guilt certain condi-
tion perceived the suspect’s guilt as more certain (M =
6.16, SD = 0.96) than did participants in the guilt uncer-
tain condition (M = 3.60, SD = 1.00). Both the suspect cat-
egorization main effect and the interaction were
nonsignificant (Fs < 1). These results showed that partici-
pants had perceived the manipulations as intended.
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Retributive affect. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the retributive af-
fect scale did not show any main effects (Fs < 1). The ab-
sence of a guilt probability main effect was surprising,
and in the Discussion I will try to explain why the results
did not show this expected main effect. However, more
important for the current purposes was that the means
showed the predicted flip-over pattern (depicted graphi-
cally in Figure 1), leading to a significant interaction,
F(1, 118) = 8.69, p < .01. When guilt was certain, partici-
pants reported more retributive affect toward the in-
group offender (M = 2.80, SD = 1.31) than toward the
outgroup offender (M = 2.21, SD = 1.40), t(59) = 1.70, p <
.05.2 When guilt was uncertain, however, participants re-
ported more retributive affect toward the outgroup sus-
pect (M = 2.97, SD = 1.58) than toward the ingroup sus-
pect (M = 2.06, SD = 1.28), t(59) = 2.45, p < .01. These
results corroborated the hypothesis.
Discussion
The results supported the hypothesis that people dis-
play more retributive affect to ingroup than outgroup of-
fenders when guilt is certain but that people display less
retributive affect to ingroup than outgroup suspects
when guilt is uncertain. Although these results were
promising, it should be noted that the absence of a guilt
probability main effect was surprising and counterintui-
tive. Despite the fact that manipulation checks showed
that the guilt probability manipulation was induced suc-
cessfully, the results did not show that people reported
less retributive affect to an uncertain guilty suspect
rather than to a certain guilty offender. How can this
peculiarity in the data be explained?
I tentatively argue that the absence of a guilt probabil-
ity main effect may be explained by the type of offense
that was investigated; that is, illegally selling entrance
tickets may be regarded as a too mild offense to elicit
strong retributive reactions among observers. In the
data, this was reflected in the fact that participants’ over-
all level of retributive affect was rather low (on a 7-point
scale, overall M = 2.50, SD = 1.43). Thus, participants in
general did not feel very angry about this offense, even in
the guilty condition, and this may have obscured dif-
ferences in reactions to certain versus uncertain guilty
offenders. This explanation for the absence of a guilt
probability main effect is speculative, and it is important
to obtain additional evidence for the general hypothesis
in a second experiment that focuses on a more severe
type of offense. In Experiment 2, participants therefore
read a scenario that involved stealing money from a
company’s cashbox.3
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, I investigated the hypothesized ef-
fects in a minimal group paradigm (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel
& Turner, 1979): Participants imagined that they worked
in a company that had either a red or a blue department.
In the scenario, a colleague that belonged either to their
own or the other department was accused of stealing
money, and the suspect’s guilt was 100% versus 50% cer-
tain. The main dependent variable consisted again of
participants’ retributive emotions, that is, their ratings of
anger and hostility toward the suspect.
Besides the above-mentioned reasons, an additional
aim of the second experiment was to rule out an impor-
tant alternative explanation; that is, it is likely that guilt
probability influences the perceived favorability of the
suspect: People are expected to perceive a certain guilty
suspect as less favorable than an uncertain guilty suspect.
It may therefore be the case that the hypothesized effects
are attributable to perceived favorability of the target. Af-
ter all, it is well-known that people derogate unfavorable
ingroup members but show ingroup favorability toward
favorable ingroup members (Marques & Paez, 1994). I
consider this alternative explanation as unlikely, for two
reasons. First, even if people perceive an uncertain guilty
suspect relatively more favorably than a certain guilty
suspect, it is nevertheless not very plausible that people
regard a crime suspect as a very favorable or prototypical
ingroup member. Second, although retributive reac-
tions may be correlated with person perceptions, it is
likely that they represent distinct types of judgments.
After all, it is very well possible that people evaluate a sus-
pect negatively and yet display remote retributive reac-
tions due to uncertain guilt probability. To empirically
show that the effects of social categorizations and guilt
probability on people’s moral emotions are indepen-
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Figure 1 Mean reported retributive affect toward the suspect as a
function of guilt probability and suspects’ categorization—
Experiment 1.
NOTE: Means were measured on 7-point scales. Higher means indi-
cate more reported retributive affect.
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dent from perceived favorability, I measured partici-
pants’ perceived favorability toward the suspect.
Method
Participants and design. The hypothesis was again
tested in a 2 (suspect categorization: ingroup vs.
outgroup) × 2 (guilt probability: certain vs. uncertain)
factorial design. A total of 100 participants were re-
cruited in the restaurant of the Free University Amster-
dam. It turned out that 5 participants were senior psy-
chology students (3rd BA year or higher). Because of the
knowledge of minimal group paradigms that these stu-
dents are likely to have, they were not included in the
analyses. This left a total of 95 participants (40 men, 55
women), varying in age from 18 to 30 years (M = 21.26,
SD = 2.55). The experiment was preceded by another un-
related study. The experiments lasted 45 min and
participants were paid 5 euros for participation.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted in the same
laboratory as Experiment 1. Again, computers were used
to present the stimulus information and to register the
data. Participants were asked to imagine themselves in
the following situation (manipulated information in
italics):
Imagine that you are an employee in a computer factory.
The computer factory has two large departments: a red
department and a blue department. You are an em-
ployee at the red department. One day it turns out that a
large sum of money has been stolen from the company’s
cashbox. There is an employee named Kees who is being
accused of having stolen the money. Kees is an employee
working at the red/blue department. The management of
the computer factory starts an investigation to find out
whether Kees, the suspected employee, has indeed
stolen the money.
After this, participants read the guilt probability manipu-
lation. In the guilt certain condition, participants read
the following information:
The investigation proves that Kees is guilty: Based on the
many pieces of evidence it can be concluded that it is
100% certain that Kees is in fact guilty of stealing money
from the company’s cashbox.
In the guilt uncertain condition, participants read the
following information:
The investigation does not prove that Kees is guilty:
Based on the mixed pieces of evidence it can be con-
cluded that there is approximately a 50% chance that
Kees is in fact guilty of stealing money from the com-
pany’s cashbox.
Following the guilt probability manipulation, partici-
pants responded to the dependent measures and the
manipulation checks. To measure participants’ retribu-
tive affect toward the suspect, I asked two similar ques-
tions as in Experiment 1 (1 = not at all, 7 = very much):
“How angry do you feel toward Kees?” and “How hostile
do you feel toward Kees?” These two questions were
again strongly correlated (r = .87, p < .001) and I aver-
aged them into a reliable retributive affect scale (α =
.93). Furthermore, to measure how favorably partici-
pants perceived the target, participants responded to
three questions asking how kind, moral, and sincere they
believed that Kees is (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). These
three items were averaged into a reliable favorability
scale (α = .79). To check the guilt probability manipula-
tion, participants were asked the following two ques-
tions: “To what extent has it been proven that Kees is
guilty of stealing money from the company’s cashbox?”
(1 = not at all, 7 = very much) and “How clear is it that Kees
is guilty of stealing money from the company’s cashbox?”
(1 = very unclear, 7 = very clear). These two questions were
strongly correlated (r = .93, p < .001) and I averaged them
into a reliable guilt probability scale (α = .96). Finally, to
check the suspect categorization manipulation, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate dichotomously in what
department (i.e., the red or the blue department) Kees
worked and in what department they themselves
worked. After this, participants were debriefed, thanked,
and paid for their participation.
Results
Manipulation checks. All participants correctly identi-
fied in what department Kees worked, and only 1 male
participant incorrectly identified his own department.
From these analyses, it can be concluded that the suspect
categorization manipulation was induced as intended.
On the guilt probability scale, a 2 × 2 ANOVA showed
a significant guilt probability main effect only, F(1, 91) =
174.34, p < .001. Participants in the guilt certain condi-
tion rated the suspect’s guilt to be more probable (M =
6.28, SD = 1.34) than did participants in the guilt uncer-
tain condition (M = 2.71, SD = 1.28). The suspect cate-
gorization main effect and the interaction were both
nonsignificant (Fs < 1). From these analyses, it can be
concluded that participants perceived the experimental
manipulations as intended.
Retributive affect. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the retributive af-
fect scale showed a significant guilt probability main ef-
fect, F(1, 91) = 20.98, p < .001. Participants in the guilt
certain condition reported more retributive affect (M =
3.81, SD = 1.51) than did participants in the guilt uncer-
tain condition (M = 2.44, SD = 1.49). Thus, in contrast to
Experiment 1, in this experiment, the data did show the
predicted guilt probability main effect. More important
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was that the pattern of means (depicted graphically in
Figure 2) showed the predicted flip-over pattern, lead-
ing to a significant interaction, F(1, 91) = 7.34, p < .01.
When guilt was certain, participants reported more re-
tributive affect toward an ingroup offender (M = 4.16,
SD = 1.39) than toward an outgroup offender (M = 3.43,
SD = 1.58), t(46) = 1.69, p < .05. When guilt was uncertain,
participants reported more retributive affect toward an
outgroup suspect (M = 2.88, SD = 1.49) than toward an
ingroup suspect (M = 1.98, SD = 1.37), t(45) = –2.15, p <
.02. These results correspond to the hypothesis
presented in this article.
Perceived favorability. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on perceived
favorability yielded a significant guilt probability main
effect only, F(1, 91) = 39.42, p < .001. Not surprisingly,
participants rated the target as less favorable when guilt
was certain (M = 3.31, SD = 0.79) than when guilt was un-
certain (M = 4.26, SD = 0.72). Of importance, both the
suspect categorization main effect and the interaction
were nonsignificant. In addition, we included perceived
favorability as a covariate in a 2 × 2 ANCOVA with retribu-
tive affect as dependent variable, and also, we included
retributive affect as a covariate in a 2 × 2 ANCOVA with
perceived favorability as a dependent variable. In both
analyses, the covariate was nonsignificant (Fs < 1) and
the results on the dependent variable in question did not
change. These results indicate that the effects of suspect
categorization and guilt probability on retributive affect
were independent from perceived favorability of the tar-
get. Perceived favorability is thus not a convincing alter-
native explanation of the current results.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 again revealed corrobo-
rative evidence for the hypothesis that people express
stronger retributive emotions toward ingroup than out-
group suspects when guilt is certain but show weaker re-
tributive emotions toward ingroup than outgroup sus-
pects when guilt is uncertain. Of importance, these
effects were revealed in a minimal group paradigm,
which suggests that the described effects are very power-
ful and can be found in a variety of situations. Further-
more, in Experiment 2, the predicted guilt probability
main effect materialized, resolving the questions that
arose from Experiment 1 by inducing a relatively more
severe offense. Finally, the experiment revealed that the
effects of suspect categorization and guilt probability on
moral emotions could not be explained by perceived
favorability of the suspect. Based on the results of both
experiments, it can be confidently concluded here that
the extent to which observers share a group membership
with suspected offenders influences the moral emotions
that they feel toward the suspect and that this influence is
moderated by guilt probability information.
Experiments 1 and 2 have extended the model of sub-
jective group dynamics by integrating the black sheep ef-
fect with a number of seemingly inconsistent findings in
the moral domain. These two experiments have indi-
cated that guilt probability moderates the influence of
social categorizations on people’s retributive emotions,
that is, their ratings of anger and hostility. These retribu-
tive emotions are important dependent variables in the
moral domain because these emotions have been ar-
gued to shape justice judgments (Haidt, 2001; Van den
Bos, 2003) and empirical research has shown that retrib-
utive emotions are closely related to punishment inten-
tions (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley et al., 2000). To fur-
ther extend the current findings, in Experiment 3, I
investigated whether the hypothesis generalizes to peo-
ple’s punishment intentions. In Experiment 3, I there-
fore asked participants how severely they believed the
suspect should be punished and how just it would be if
the offender were severely punished.
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
Participants and design. The hypothesis was again
tested in a 2 (suspect categorization: ingroup vs.
outgroup) × 2 (guilt certainty: certain vs. uncertain) fac-
torial design. A total of 106 participants (38 men, 68
women), varying in age from 18 to 55 years (M = 21.08,
SD = 5.33), were recruited in the restaurant of the Free
University Amsterdam and participated voluntarily. The
experiment was preceded by two other unrelated experi-
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Figure 2 Mean reported retributive affect toward the suspect as a
function of guilt probability and suspects’ categorization—
Experiment 2.
NOTE: Means were measured on 7-point scales. Higher means indi-
cate more reported retributive affect.
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on November 29, 2010psp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
ments. The experiments lasted a total of 45 min and par-
ticipants were paid 5 euros for participation in the
experiments.
Procedure. Participants responded to the stimulus in-
formation in the same laboratory and on the same com-
puters as in Experiments 1 and 2. Participants were
asked to read a paragraph. To enhance mundane real-
ism, participants were told that the paragraph contained
a description of a true event that happened some time
ago. The paragraph read as follows (manipulated infor-
mation in italics):
Some time ago, bicycles were regularly being stolen from
the cycle racks at the Free University of Amsterdam.
After some time, a suspect was arrested. This suspect
turned out to be a student of the Free University of Amster-
dam/Leiden University.4 An investigation about the poten-
tial role of the suspect in the bicycle thefts was started.
After this, participants read the guilt probability manipu-
lation. In the guilt certain condition, participants read
the following:
In the investigation, the guilt of the suspect is proven:
Based on the many pieces of evidence, it can be con-
cluded that it is 100% certain that this suspect is in fact
guilty of stealing bicycles from the Free University’s cycle
racks.
In the guilt uncertain condition, participants read the
following:
In the investigation, the guilt of the suspect is not proven:
Based on the mixed pieces of evidence, it can be roughly
estimated that there is approximately a 50% chance that
this suspect is in fact guilty of stealing bicycles from the
Free University’s cycle racks.
After reading the paragraph, participants responded to
the dependent variables and the manipulation checks.
The main dependent variables were participants’ pun-
ishment intentions, which were solicited with the follow-
ing two items: “How severely do you think the suspect
should be punished?” (1 = not very severely, 7 = very severely)
and “How just would it be if the suspect were severely
punished?” (1 = very unjust, 7 = very just). These two items
turned out to be strongly correlated (r = .86, p < .001) and
I averaged them into a reliable retributive justice scale
(α = .92). To measure perceived favorability of the sus-
pect, participants responded to three items asking how
kind, trustworthy, and respectable they believed that the
suspect is (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). These three items
were averaged into a reliable favorability scale (α = .82).
To check the guilt probability manipulation, partici-
pants answered the following two items: “How certain is
it that the suspect is guilty of stealing bicycles?” (1 = very
uncertain, 7 = very certain) and “How clear is it that the sus-
pect is guilty of stealing bicycles?” (1 = very unclear, 7 = very
clear). These two items were strongly correlated (r = .92,
p < .001) and I averaged them into a reliable guilt proba-
bility scale (α = .96). To check the suspect categorization
manipulation, I asked the following two questions (1 =
not at all, 7 = very much): “Was the suspect a student from
the Free University Amsterdam?” and “Was the suspect
a student from Leiden University?”. After this, partici-
pants were fully debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results
Manipulation checks. A 2 × 2 MANOVA on the two items
to check the suspect categorization manipulation
showed a significant main effect of suspect categoriza-
tion only, both on the multivariate and univariate levels,
multivariate F(2, 101) = 940.00, p < .001; the Free Univer-
sity item F(1, 102) = 1821.34, p < .001; the Leiden Univer-
sity item F(1, 102) = 733.66, p < .001. Participants in the
ingroup condition agreed more to the statement that
the suspect was a student at the Free University Amster-
dam (M = 6.80, SD = .71) and less to the statement that
the suspect was a student at Leiden University (M = 1.44,
SD = 1.14) than did participants in the outgroup condi-
tion (M = 1.15, SD = 0.64 and M = 6.81, SD = 0.89, respec-
tively). These results indicate that participants perceived
the suspect categorization manipulation as intended.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt probability scale showed a
significant guilt probability main effect only, F(1, 102) =
251.89, p < .001. Participants in the guilt certain condi-
tion rated the suspect’s guilt as more probable (M = 6.46,
SD = 1.06) than did participants in the guilt uncertain
condition (M = 2.83, SD = 1.30). These analyses revealed
that the experimental manipulations were successful.
Retributive justice judgments. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on retribu-
tive justice judgments showed a significant guilt proba-
bility main effect, F(1, 102) = 144.95, p < .001. In corre-
spondence with the findings obtained in Experiment 2,
participants were more favorable about severe punish-
ments if the suspect’s guilt was certain (M = 5.39, SD =
1.03) than if the suspect’s guilt was uncertain (M = 3.04,
SD = 1.64). More important was that this analyses also
showed a significant interaction, F(1, 102) = 7.95, p < .01.
The pattern of means showed the predicted flip-over pat-
tern, which is depicted graphically in Figure 3. If the sus-
pect’s guilt was certain, participants were more favorable
about severe punishments if the offender was an ingroup
member (M = 5.66, SD = 0.85) than if the offender was an
outgroup member (M = 5.10, SD = 1.13), t(52) = 2.08, p <
.03. However, if the suspect’s guilt was uncertain, partici-
pants were more favorable about severe punishments if
the offender was an outgroup member (M = 3.48, SD =
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1.76) than if the offender was an ingroup member (M =
2.60, SD = 1.41), t(50) = 2.00, p < .03. These results again
corroborated the hypothesis.
Perceived favorability. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on perceived
favorability of the suspect again yielded a significant guilt
probability main effect, F(1, 102) = 29.12, p < .001. In cor-
respondence with Experiment 2, participants rated the
suspect less favorable when guilt was certain (M = 2.76,
SD = 0.84) than when guilt was uncertain (M = 3.65, SD =
0.84). The other effects were nonsignificant. We then in-
cluded perceived favorability as a covariate in a 2 × 2
ANCOVA with retributive justice judgments as a depen-
dent variable and retributive justice judgments as a co-
variate in a 2 × 2 ANCOVA with perceived favorability as
a dependent variable. Although both perceived favor-
ability and retributive justice were significant covariates,
the main results did not change (i.e., a significant inter-
action on retributive justice judgments and no interac-
tion on perceived favorability). These analyses indicate
that suspect categorization and guilt probability exert ef-
fects on retributive justice judgments that are distinct
from the effects on perceived favorability of the suspect.
In correspondence with Experiment 2, perceived favor-
ability does not constitute a convincing alternative expla-
nation to the current findings.
Discussion
Experiment 3 again supported the hypothesis and re-
vealed that the predicted effects generalize to people’s
retributive justice judgments. Taken together, Experi-
ments 1 through 3 provide solid evidence for the line of
reasoning presented in the introduction. However, it
should be noted that the results in these three studies
were based on an experimentally induced guilt prob-
ability manipulation that does not correspond to how
people usually gauge guilt probability in everyday life sit-
uations (e.g., rarely do people encounter explicit infor-
mation that guilt is 50% probable). Experiment 4 was
designed to replicate the current effects with a more
mundane manipulation of guilt probability; that is, in
Experiment 4, guilt probability was manipulated by
means of evidence that either proved that the suspect
was guilty (the guilt certain condition) or that suggested
that guilt was uncertain (the guilt uncertain condition).
As in Experiment 3, the dependent variable consisted of
participants’ retributive justice judgments.
EXPERIMENT 4
Method
Participants and design. The design was again a 2 (sus-
pect categorization: ingroup vs. outgroup) × 2 (guilt
probability: certain vs. uncertain) factorial design. Par-
ticipants were 86 Free University students (24 men, 62
women) with ages varying from 18 to 24 years (M = 19.84,
SD = 1.54). The experiment had the format of a brief
paper-and-pencil task, and participants who had just par-
ticipated in other unrelated experiments were asked
whether they were willing to participate in the study.
Procedure. Participants read the same bicycle theft sce-
nario as in Experiment 3. However, the guilt probability
manipulation was different in Experiment 4. In the guilt
certain condition, participants read that video surveil-
lance cameras had recorded the bicycle thefts and that
on the tapes it was clearly visible how the suspect was
stealing bicycles. In the guilt uncertain condition, partic-
ipants read that video surveillance cameras had re-
corded the bicycle thefts but that on the tapes it was un-
clear whether it was the suspect or someone else who was
stealing the bicycles.
To measure retributive justice judgments, partici-
pants were asked how fair, just, and correct it would be if
the suspect were severely punished (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much). These three items were averaged into a reliable
retributive justice scale (α = .98). To check the guilt prob-
ability manipulation, participants were asked how proba-
ble and how certain it is that the suspect is guilty (1 = not
at all, 7 = very much). These two items were averaged into
a reliable guilt probability scale (α = .95). Finally, partici-
pants were asked dichotomously whether the suspect was
a student from the Free University Amsterdam or from
Leiden University.
Results
Manipulation checks. On the dichotomous check of
suspect’s categorization, only 2 participants gave an in-
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Figure 3 Mean retributive justice judgments as a function of guilt
probability and suspects’ categorization—Experiment 3.
NOTE: Means were measured on 7-point scales. Higher means indi-
cate stronger punishment intentions.
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correct answer (1 in the ingroup and 1 in the outgroup
condition). These participants were included in the sam-
ple (results were similar when these participants were ex-
cluded). These results showed that participants correctly
identified the categorization of the suspect.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA on the guilt probability scale pro-
duced a significant guilt probability main effect only,
F(1, 82) = 297.19, p < .001. Participants perceived guilt as
more certain in the guilt certain condition (M = 6.51,
SD = 0.62) than in the guilt uncertain condition (M =
2.78, SD = 1.31). These results revealed that participants
had perceived the manipulations as intended.
Retributive justice judgments. A 2 × 2 ANOVA on retribu-
tive justice judgments showed a significant guilt proba-
bility main effect, F(1, 82) = 119.82, p < .001. In corre-
spondence with Experiments 2 and 3, participants
perceived severe punishment as fairer when guilt was
certain (M = 5.17, SD = 1.24) than when guilt was uncer-
tain (M = 2.13, SD = 1.42). More important was that this
analysis also produced a significant interaction, F(1,
82) = 6.23, p < .02. The means again showed the pre-
dicted flip-over pattern, which is depicted graphically in
Figure 4. When guilt was certain, participants perceived
severe punishment as fairer when the offender was an
ingroup member (M = 5.48, SD = 1.08) than when the of-
fender was an outgroup member (M = 4.86, SD = 1.33),
t(44) = 1.75, p < .05. When guilt was uncertain, partici-
pants perceived severe punishment as more fair when
the suspect was an outgroup member (M = 2.49, SD =
1.71) than when the suspect was an ingroup member
(M = 1.72, SD = 0.88), t(38) = –1.77, p < .05. These results
again corroborated the hypothesis.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of four experiments indicated that peo-
ple’s moral judgments were influenced by a crime sus-
pect’s social categorization. Furthermore, these social
categorization effects were moderated by the likelihood
that the suspect was guilty: If guilt was certain, par-
ticipants displayed more severe retributive reactions to
ingroup than outgroup offenders, but when guilt was un-
certain, participants showed less severe retributive reac-
tions to ingroup than outgroup suspects. This pattern
was replicated in three types of offensive situations using
both experimentally induced and more mundane guilt
probability information. Taken together, the present re-
sults provided evidence for the notion that people’s
moral judgments toward suspected offenders are mod-
erated by social categorization and guilt probability in
ways that can be deduced from theoretical analyses of
social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the
model of subjective group dynamics (Abrams et al.,
2000; Marques et al., 1998; Marques et al., 2001).
On a broader level, the current findings fit into a so-
cial justice research tradition that has shown that social
structures such as group membership influence issues of
morality. Accumulating research has indicated that peo-
ple’s subjective sense of right and wrong is strongly re-
lated to social categorizations and group memberships
(e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, &
Lind, 1998; Tyler & Lind, 1992; van Prooijen, Van den
Bos, & Wilke, 2004a, 2004b, in press). Most of this previ-
ous justice research had a self-centered perspective on
morality because it focused on how group memberships
influenced people’s perceptions of when they them-
selves are being unfairly treated (e.g., people’s personal
experiences of procedural injustice). Thus, whereas pre-
vious research has shown that social categorizations
shape people’s reactions when they themselves are sub-
jected to unfairness, the current research revealed that
social categorizations also influence people’s sense of
morality when they are independent observers of an un-
just event. This focus on people’s sense of morality when
they are observers of unjust events reflects a recent trend
in justice research that has emphasized the need to study
laypeople’s reactions when they observe social trans-
gressions (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 2003; Feather, 1998;
Finkel & Sales, 1997; Skitka & Crosby, 2003).
The research reported here revealed only a guilt
probability main effect on participants’ perceptions of
guilt (see the manipulation check findings across experi-
ments). Thus, participants in the uncertain conditions
did not perceive ingroup offenders as less guilty than
outgroup offenders. Nevertheless, uncertain guilt prob-
ability did lead participants to be more lenient in their
retributive reactions toward ingroup than outgroup sus-
pects. These findings suggest that even when people
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probability and suspects’ categorization—Experiment 4.
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consider guilt to be equally probable for ingroup and
outgroup suspects, they nevertheless are more con-
cerned about guilt probability in the case of ingroup
than outgroup suspects. After all, guilty ingroup offend-
ers reflect negatively on the group (Abrams et al., 2000;
Marques et al., 1998; Marques et al., 2001) and, hence,
the question of whether the ingroup suspect is guilty has
implications for people’s social identity. Because of these
self-relevant implications, certain versus uncertain guilt
indications may lead to more extreme retributive reac-
tions in the case of ingroup rather than outgroup
suspects, a proposition that was supported by the current
experiments.
This causal influence of guilt probability on retribu-
tive reactions to ingroup and outgroup suspects consti-
tutes an important extension of previous work by Kerr
et al. (1995), who focused on perceived guilt as a de-
pendent variable. Moreover, the present research has in-
dicated that the boundary conditions identified in the
Kerr et al. study (i.e., Kerr et al. only found their effects
among minority group jurors in a multiracial mock jury)
are not necessary to find effects of social categorizations
and guilt probability on retributive reactions. After all, a
series of four experiments indicated that the predicted
effects emerged among independent observers who did
not anticipate complex intergroup interactions. These
considerations suggest that guilt probability and social
categorizations exert unique and powerful effects on re-
tributive reactions, a proposition that is further strength-
ened by the finding that the effects emerged in a mini-
mal intergroup situation (Experiment 2). These
findings may have important implications in many real-
life circumstances, both for jurors in a court trial and for
laypeople who form impressions of crime suspects.
The present experiments focused on moderate of-
fenses that did not cause extreme levels of harm (i.e., ille-
gally selling entrance tickets, stealing money from a com-
pany, stealing bicycles). I did not incorporate very
severely offensive stimulus materials to avoid ceiling ef-
fects. Research has shown preliminary evidence that
punishment intentions can be influenced by social fac-
tors in the case of moderate offenses but less so in the
case of severe offenses (Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, &
Scott, 2004). In a similar vein, a severe offense might lead
to extreme retributive reactions, presumably obscuring
any moderating effects of social categorizations (to illus-
trate, both ingroup and outgroup serial killers are likely
to elicit extreme retributive reactions). This problem
originates from the apparent strong effects of offense
severity on retributive reactions but does not imply that
people do not experience identity threats when ingroup
members commit severe offenses. It might be the case
that extremely severe offenses lead people to seek addi-
tional ways to symbolically exclude the offender, such as
dehumanization. Given that severity is a factor of obvious
importance whenever studying reactions to offenders,
these ideas point at challenging opportunities for fur-
ther study.
In a recent study, Wenzel (2004) has proposed that
people may have different motivations to punish in-
group versus outgroup offenders. In his research,
Wenzel distinguished between two forms of punishment
reactions to transgressors: a competitive and a coopera-
tive form. The competitive form states that people pun-
ish offenders to restore a moral balance by reducing the
offender’s status and power relative to the victim and so-
ciety. The cooperative form emphasizes that people pun-
ish offenders to restore the validity of the values that have
been violated. The results of Wenzel’s study indicated
that people endorse the cooperative motive for punish-
ment relatively more when they share a social identifica-
tion with an offender, but people pursue the competitive
motive relatively more when they do not share a social
identification with an offender. This study suggested that
people may display retributive reactions to ingroup ver-
sus outgroup offenders for different reasons: In the case
of ingroup offenders, people seek to confirm the values
that are considered to be important within the group,
but in the case of outgroup offenders, people seek to de-
grade the status of the offender. Clearly, more research is
needed to investigate the idea that social categorizations
activate differential motivations to punish.
To conclude, the present studies contribute to scien-
tists’ understanding of laypeople’s reactions to sus-
pected offenders. Four studies have shown that social
categorizations and guilt probability influence inde-
pendent observer’s moral reactions to suspected offend-
ers: When guilt is certain, people display more retribu-
tive affect and punishment intentions toward ingroup
than outgroup offenders, but when guilt is uncertain,
people display ingroup favorability toward the ingroup
suspect. It can therefore be concluded that social catego-
rizations and guilt probability are important moderators
of people’s retributive reactions to suspected offenders.
NOTES
1. In fact, the room for reasonable doubt eventually proved to be
sufficient for the jury to find O. J. Simpson not guilty; of importance,
this acquittal took place after Graham and her colleagues had col-
lected their data.
2. Given that I tested a very specific hypothesis, the t tests reported
in this article are one-tailed.
3. In a pilot study, I tested among 91 participants (36 men, 55
women, ages varying from 18 to 46 years) how severely they rated the
three offenses of the four experiments (1 = not very severe, 7 = very severe).
A repeated-measures analysis revealed that the three offenses differed
in perceived severity, F(2, 89) = 78.48, p < .001, with the offense of
Experiment 1 being less severe (M = 3.31, SD = 1.51) than those of
Experiment 2 (M = 5.29, SD = 1.28) and Experiments 3 and 4 (M = 4.40,
SD = 1.60). The contrast testing severity of the Experiment 1 offense
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versus severity of the Experiment 2 through 4 offenses was significant,
F(1, 90) = 82.46, p < .001.
4. Leiden University is located relatively close to the Free University
of Amsterdam: It takes only 35 min in public transport to travel from
Leiden University to the Free University of Amsterdam. Furthermore,
it is very common for students in the Netherlands to take one or two
courses at a different university than one’s own. Thus, the mere pres-
ence of a Leiden University student at the Free University Amsterdam
is not suspicious in itself.
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